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Abstract
The notions of time and causality are revisited, as well as the A- and B-theories of time, in order
to determine which theory of time is most compatible with relativistic spacetimes. Using time-
orientation as one of the fundamental parameters in our manifold, we will describe the concept of time
and time-series (the ordering of events in time) in Special and General Relativity and their intrinsic
differences. The notions of A-theory and B-theory will be given mathematical interpretations within
the scheme of General Relativity. As result, in time-orientable spacetimes, the notions of events
being in the future and past, which are notions of A-thoery, are more fundamental than the notions
of events being earlier than or later than than other events, which are notions of B-theory. This
supports the A-theory of time vs. the B-theory of time. Furthermore, we find that B-theory notions
are are incompatible with some structures found in globally hyperbolic spacetimes, namely past and
future inextendible curves.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Relativity changed our conception of time, it brought spatial properties to our temporal
structure, and forced us to consider space and time as one unit: spacetime. This mixing of
space and time has leads to several interpretation of time, see [1], [2]. e.g, any statement about
the current date (say, that the universe is nearly 14 billion years old) as a subjective statement
about our location in spacetime, akin to the statement that we are in the Milky Way, rather
than a matter of fact about spacetime or the universe itself. This view conceives the world as
a block-universe in which any description of the ordering of events in time that involves the
notions of future and past should be replaced by the notion of events being "earlier than"
and "later than" other events. This view is called B-theory [3]. A-theorist, on the other
hand, holds the opposite view: the notions of past, present and future are irreducible and
fundamental. In this paper we will show that 1) In time-orientable spacetimes the notions of
future and past are more fundamental than the notions of "earlier than", or "later than" as
described by the A and B- theories of time 2) The notions of later than and earlier than are
incompatible with globally hyperbolic spacetimes. Therefore, General Relativity restricted
to globally hyperbolic spacetimes is an A-theory of time.
To show this we will build, with the formalism of general relativity, notions of events and
time-series (ordering of events) that are compatible with Mctaggart’s usage in his seminal
paper about the unreality of time [4]. We will show that some of the conclusions drawn from
the theory of relativity, which historically have deemed A-theory incompatible with relativity,
assume a global Minkowski spacetime (for instance, see [5]) and the notions of relative past
and future. By extending these analysis to curved spacetime, i.e. general relativity on
time-orieantable spacetimes, the notions of relative past and future will be discarded and
the A-theory will not only become relevant, but the notions of past and future will prove
essential to ordering events in time.
In the next section we will describe the differences between A- and B-theories. In section
III we will use Strawson’s notion of ontological prioricity to argue that the concepts of
past- and future-directedness of trajectories in general relativity are more fundamental than
the "later than", "earlier than" relations between events in time (relations which will be
mathematically defined as the -relation). Then, in section IV, we will move from ordering
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events in time within one future-directed trajectory to ordering hypersurfaces of events in
time; this will be done by defining the notions of chronological past and future which will
eventually lead to the notion of Cauchy surfaces and global hyperbolocity. Finally in section
V, we will show that global hyperbolocity can only be defined within the A-theory of time,
and not within the B-theory due to the crucial concept of past and future inextendibility
which can be expressed in A-theory terms, but cannot be translated to B-theory terms. This
implies that the the notions of future and past are relevant to our objective description of
the universe and not a subjective statement about our location in it, and that these notions
should be part of out objective description of the universe at the level of spacetime theories.
This are the premises and conclusion of the paper:
1. When entity β can only be defined in terms of α and α can be defined independent of
β, then α is ontologically prior to β (Strawson’ notion of ontological priority).
2. The concepts of past-orientation and future-orientation of velocities and curves are
ontologically prior to the -relation.
3. Therefore, the conceptual scheme of general relativity contains α-properties as onto-
logically prior to β-properties.
4. Consequently, another consequence from 1 and 2 in these is that there exists, within
GR restricted to globally hyperbolic spacetimes (see ref. [6], [7]), A-theory expressions
that are irreducible to B-theory expressions.
Before justifying the premises, let us describe the A-theory and B-theory, considering the
arguments from special relativity that are made to favor B-theory.
II. A THEORY AND B THEORY
A-theory and B-theory are used in philosophy to distinguish two ways of describing events
in time. In A-theory, we describe events1 as being past, present or future. Furthermore, that
1 For now by event we will mean the content of a particular moment in time (where “moment” may have
any duration). For instance, The Battle of Waterloo is an event. Later these notions will be formalized to
the standard definition within GR.
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we are at the present, or that the present date is thus and such, are irreducible facts about
events in time. For a B-theorist, events in time are to be described as being “earlier than” or
“later than” other events; they may also be described as having a temporal position of t, as
in a coordinate axis, but there is no further fact about the event being in the past, present
or future which cannot be stated in B-theory terms.
An important difference between these types of expressions is that the description from
A-theory can be true at one time and false at another time, while B-theory expressions ("later
than", "earlier than") are always true. Moreover, the B-theory states that it is always possible
to recast A-expressions in terms of B-expressions. For instance, take the expression: “E1 is
in the future”. B-theory would claim that the moment you are at —event E0— is earlier than
E1.
Note that “E0 is earlier than E1” is an unchanging fact (true proposition) about E1 and
E0. Also, note that while the A-theory only explicitly mentions E1, the B-theory has to
introduce a second event in its B-expression; B-expressions always involves two events (this
is an important point because we will argue that general relativity uses A-expressions to
describe a situation in which we cannot find two such events). We have then reduced our
A-expression, “E1 is in the future”, which is thought by the A-theory to be true now, but false
in the future (when E1 is past or present) to a statement about how E1 stands in relation to
E0, which is always true.
Another way we can describe events in A-theory is by ascribing to them the intrinsic
(i.e., observer-independent) properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity. For instance,
one may say that the action of writing this paper has the property of being in the past,
or pastness, which you are now reading in the present. Then, the event of you reading
this paper has presentness, and the event of you being done reading this paper has futurity.
These notions are trivial to everyone but can turn out difficult and fundamental if we want to
describe them in mathematical terms. These temporal properties are also called A-properties.
Another A-property is that of being directed towards the future or the past. We will comment
more on this new A-properties later.
In this work we relate A-theory only with the existence of temporal properties (or the
irreducibility of A-expressions). We will not deal with the concepts of the flow of time or
4
FIG. 1: Minkowski diagram for and observer O who is in the future and and observer O′ who is in
the present of the event.
change. Following Pearson’s version of A-theory [1], we maintain that the flow of time,
which is normally an idea attributed to A-theory, is not directly implied by the existence
of A-properties (although A-expressions are friendly to the concept of the flow of time).
The question we will focus on is whether events in relativity have temporal properties, or
are events only to be thought of as being later or earlier than (or simultaneous with) other
events. 2
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM SPECIAL RELATIVITY
This argument stems from the notions of relative past and relative future found in Special
Relativity. Observer O defines a global equal-time hypersurface given by points orthogonal
to the global time coordinate axis that can be defined by the light cone in the rest frame of
observer O (that is, the frame in which O has a velocity of 0), see Fig. 1. Depending on the
velocity of a different observer O′ relative to O, the light cone can have a different shape,
2 The growing block universe, which is thought as an A-theory, would be compatible with this take on A-
theory if interpreted as defending the existence of the temporal properties of pastness and presentness, see
[1], [8]
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and the equal-time hypersurfaces a different inclination, in O′’s rest frame. Therefore, two
observers will have two different sets of events3 as being present (the same goes for future
and past).
For this other observer O′, moving at an arbitrary velocity less than the speed of light,
some of the events (those outsides of the light cone) that are ordered, in our original picture, as
being in the future now appear to be in the present. Moreover, some events are simultaneous
in the present for O and in the past or future for O′. If this is the case then we have to accept
that events cannot really have presentness (or pastness, or futurity) as an intrinsic property,
since for different observers, the same event can be in the past or in the future, depending
on the relative velocity between the observers O and O′.
As Adrian Bardon, a supporter of B-theory, states, according to relativity “the temporal
location of ‘now’ is just as much a subjective matter as the spatial location of here” and that
“if relativity is right, then the dynamic theory [A-theory] of time must be wrong. All events,
past, present, and future, are described by some frame of reference. Without a real past,
present, and future, there can be no passage of time and no dynamic change.” [5].
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME OF GENERAL RELATIVITY
Much of the reasoning behind the previous conclusion has to be modified if it is to apply
to spacetime within the framework of general relativity, i.e. within the structure of smooth
orientable connected relativistic manifold (M, g). For this we will try to construct concepts
that coincide with our intuitive notion of a time-series using the formalism behind general
relativity. We will see that the problems for the A-theory encountered in a global Minkowski
spacetime do not arise. First, let us briefly define a relativistic time-orientable spacetime.
Definition 1: Spacetime is a D-dimensional topological connected manifold
with a smooth atlas locally equipped with the Lorentzian Metric which preserves
time-orientation.
The time-orientation is a vector field T defined everywhere in the manifold such that,
at the tangent space at each point g(T , T ) > 0. Given a notion of co-orientation defined
3 By event from now on, we will mean a point in spacetime.
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for any two vectors as g(µ, ν) > 0, we find two equivalence classes of vectors co-oriented
with the time-orientation along the manifold corresponding to the two half-light cones of the
Lorentzian metric. In general, it may not be possible to consistently relate all the light cones
in a spacetime with a single equivalence class of vectors; that is, there may not exist a smooth
vector field T such that at every point it is co-oriented with a timelike or null vector. But
when we say the spacetime is time-orientable, we are stating that there exists such a smooth
vector field T .
Definition 2: A vector µ is future-oriented if and only if it is co-oriented with
the time-orientation T .
That is, when:
g(µ, T ) > 0. (1)
Likewise, we say a vector ν is past-oriented if and only if:
g(ν, T ) < 0. (2)
Any vector must be co-oriented with T in order to be pointing to the future, the direction
of T representing one of the two half-light cones. Defining a time-orientation amounts to
assigning the vectors within one of the cones to be pointing to the future, and assigning the
vectors in the other cone to be pointing to the past (and hence we introduce the asymmetry
of time into the theory).
The inclusion of a time-orientation in the definition of spacetime is not warranted by
Einstein’s equations. Dennis Lehmkuhl notes that conformal structure only allows for the
possibility of choosing which half cone in the double-conic structure is directed towards the
future or towards the past, but it does not force such a choice. Einstein’s equations are
compatible with a spacetime with no time-orientation, although spacetime itself must be
orientable. That is to say, the vector-field T must be definable but the spacetime does not
require the addition of this structure for Einstein’s equations to apply [9].
Lehmkuhl also notes that Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker spacetimes, which cor-
responds to spacetimes that can have a global metric at large scales in which we can define
a global time-coordinate [9], may best represent our universe. Spacetimes where such global
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time-coordinate can be defined are call globally hyperbolic. In this section, we will not con-
sider these solutions of the Einstein equations in particular, we will only need spacetime to
be temporally orientable with time-orientation T . Stronger time-related conditions on the
manifold, based on causality, will be considered briefly in section 5. Now we ask: how is
time-orientability a reasonable assumption?
If we were to permeate spacetime with material particles, the velocities of their curves
would define a time-orientation. In fact, this is precisely what is done in Friedmann space-
times; the energy-momentum tensor T µν is defined to represent an ideal fluid, isotropic and
homogenous, defined on all points of the manifoldM . The solutions to this equation are met-
rics that indeed define a time-orientable universe. Imposing such an energy-momentum tensor
together with Einstein equations are much stronger restriction than just time-orientability.
Given the above considerations about causality and cosmology, time-orientation is a reason-
able assumption. Now that a time-orientation is assumed, we can create a time-series by
considering a timelike curve in spacetime:
Definition 3: A curve γ is said to be future-directed if the velocity field defined
by its trajectory satisfies g(vγ, T ) at the tangent space TpM of every point p
where p is an image of the curve.
And that the expression "v ∈ TpM at point p is a future directed vector" is an A-expression
given that it only involves one event, p, and it serves to order events in time. The time-series
constructed by following a future-oriented trajectory would be an A-series. Nevertheless,
this A-expression can be translated to a B-expression as well and hence we can likewise order
the events from earlier to later. We can define a formal relation that stems for timelike
trajectories and can produce the time-series above, but this relation will still require the
notions of future and past orientation.
Definition 4: Consider a timelike future-oriented curve γ : [a, b] → M . These
statements are equivalent:
• γ(a) = p and γ(b) = q for a > b.
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• q  p.4
• q is later than p.
Points related by the -relation form a B-series, the -relation expressing a time order
between the two events, and hence making the relation a B-property (being later than or
earlier than). Moreover, events are ordered in this way for any observer, and in any chart, and
hence they form a family of objective B-series. Nevertheless, while both series are compatible
with our ordering of events within a timelike curves, A-properties (being in the future, being
in the past) will prove more fundamental than B-properties. This will ultimately be the case
due to the fundamentality, or ontological prioricity, of the future-directed velocity of curves
(understood as directional derivatives) in the scheme of general relativity.
Let us justify the ontological priority of velocity in general relativity. To do so we will
use Strawson’s notion of ontological priority. He invites us to imagine a language and to
“suppose, for instance, it should turn out that there is a type of particulars, β, such that
particulars of type β cannot be identified without reference to particulars of another type, α,
whereas particulars of the type α can be identified without reference to particulars of type β
[10]. Strawson claims that, under the conceptual scheme that underlies our ability to identify
particulars (given a language), α-particulars will be more fundamental, or ontologically prior,
to β-particular. If such a dependence were to be found in our language, Strawson argues, will
have “some significance for an inquiry into the general structure of the conceptual scheme
in terms of which we think about particulars” [10] That there is such a conceptual struc-
ture is then revealed by the fact that we find this dependence when identifying particulars.
Strawson’s objective is not to create an ontology in which α –particulars and β-particular
are related in this way, but rather just to describe the ontological structure already present
in the conceptual scheme we use when speaking and thinking about particulars.
Consider the conceptual scheme of general relativity. We can translate this definition to
reveal the ontological priority of concepts in GR. Imagine a function that is defined in terms
of certain objects which can, in turn, be defined without the aid of the function. That is, we
cannot identify such functions without knowing the values or characters of the objects that
4 if curve γ is null, the the relation between q and p is written as ≥.
9
defines it, but the objects themselves can be identified without the function. This situation
is quite analogous to Strawson’s, but instead of speaking of particulars using English, we are
using mathematical objects. The objects we are considering are precisely the velocities of the
trajectories, and their lengths (or any curved coordinate defined over their extension). Given
the structures of dependencies, velocity is ontologically prior to the length in the conceptual
scheme of general relativity. The velocity of the curve γ at point p is a linear map:
vγ,p : C∞(M)→ R. (3)
f→ vγ,p := (f ◦ γ)′(λ0), (4)
where C∞(M) is the set of all smooth functions defined in the manifold and the prime (′)
signifies differentiation with respect to the parameter λ.
This definition of velocities amounts to saying that the directional derivative or the rate
of change of a function defined in spacetime over a trajectory (with respect to a parameter
γ) is the velocity. The value of the operation is not what defines the velocity, but rather the
operator: the velocity is the directional derivative itself, in the direction of the trajectory, at
a point p, independently of the function f on which it acts. Unlike Newtonian mechanics,
in general relativity we define the velocity without any reference to position or lengths: and
this has to be so, given the framework of differentiable manifolds.
One could protest that the concept of being a velocity demands a speed, and hence it has
to include its magnitude, which requires a metric to be defined. To this, it will suffice to
say that we only need this coarser definition of velocity as a directional derivative to develop
our argument. It is the fact that such a notion is allowed, prior to defining a notion of
chronological order or events, that will make the notions of future-directed and past-directed
vectors ontologically prior to proper time and other temporal notions that require the velocity
in their definitions. As an example, we take the proper time, or length of a trajectory, which,
is given by choosing a metric and defined by the length functional:
τ =
∫
γ
√
gµνdxµdxν . (5)
By our notion of ontological prioricity, we then find that velocities (understood as direc-
tional derivatives of trajectories) are prior to lengths. We know that mathematically this is
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so, and the further claim is that this mathematical structure reveals an ontological structure
of dependencies in our mathematical language. In the same way that the identification of
particulars reveals the ontological structure present in the scheme we use to describe time.
Now we are in a position to prove the fundamentality of A-properties:
Proposition 1: A future directed curve is more fundamental than (ontologically
prior to) the -relation.
Proof. We defined a future directed curve γ as one where at every point p in the image of
the curve, g(vγ, T ) > 0whereT is the time-orientation. Nevertheless we require the notion
of such a curve to define the -relation.
This proofs the fundamentality of a future-directed curve within this conceptual scheme.
Moreover, given that future-orientation is an A-property, and the-relation is an B-property,
we have a case where, within the Generatl Relativity, A-properties are more fundamental than
B-properties. This is the hierarchy of entities suggested by the conceptual scheme of general
relativity. In this hierarchy, A-properties come out on top of B-properties, but they are both
still compatible with General Relativity on time-orientable spacetimes. To see when the
problem arise from the B-theory, we will have to consider the ordering of entire subsets of M
in a time-series and globally hyperbolic spacetimes.
The following are definitions related to this section that we will used later:
Definition 5: Let γ[a, b] be a segment of a null future-directed curve. Then, if
a < b and γ[a] = p, γ[b] = q, then we say that q ≥ p.
V. TIME-SERIES AND GENERAL RELATIVITY.
To reach globally hyperbolic spacetimes, we will expand the notions of a time-series beyond
the notions of a timelike-curve and consider the most general form of a time-series that GR
can offer. Then we will answer the question: are the notions of past, present or future
necessary for these description or do the notions of later than, earlier than (which will be
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formally defined) suffice? It is in building the constraints required for a globally hyperbolic
spacetime 5. when the shortfall of B-expressions will arise.
Definition 7: We define the chronological future of p ∈ M , I+(p) as the set
that can be reached by future-directed timelike curves starting from p.
I+(p) = {q ∈M |∃ a future directed timelike curveλ(t) withλ(0) = p and λ(t′) = q} .
By drawing a family of timelike, future-directed curves, we are collecting a series of events
that we know are, in the framework of general relativity, ordered from earlier to later ab-
solutely, within each trajectory. This relation between the events cannot be contested, it is
chart-independent. Each timelike, or lightlike future-directed curve by itself can be consid-
ered a time-series of ordered points. Nevertheless, there is still a further question of how are
the points between the different curves in I+(p) ordered in time. To do this we have to talk
about the chronological future of sets. We can define the chronological future of a subset
S ⊂M , denoted I+(S) as:
I+(S) =
⋃
p∈S
I+(p). (6)
Here we are drawing all possible timelike curves from all points in S, and stating that the
points within these trajectories form a set which is in the future of the set S. Nevertheless,
how the points in I+(S) relate temporally within themselves is not yet clear. To do this we
have to introduce achronal sets.
Definition 8: A subset S is called achronal if there are no points p, q ∈ S :
q ∈ I+(p) [12], that is, points within the subset that are not communicated by
timelike curves.
This subset S is not necessarily an hypersurface inM or any subset ofM . Nevertheless there
is a way to guarantee that the points in an achornal subset form a three-dimensional subset.
The next theorem (theorem 8.1.3 in [13]) states that the boundary of any subset S of M
defines an achronal subset that forms a three-dimensional surface embedded on M .
5 See Ref. [7], [11] for an extended review about globally hyperbolic spacetime.
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Theorem 1. Let (M, gµν) be a time-orientable spacetime, and let S ⊂ M . Then I+(S)
is an achronal, three-dimensional, embedded C0- submanifold of M .
Since these points are not themselves ordered in time (they do not form a time-series), but
they do form a three-dimensional surface reminiscing of a plane of simultaneity, one may be
tempted to say that these points are all at the same time. Nevertheless, there is not enough
structure to define such a notion clearly. Only when we have the much more stringent global
structure of a Cauchy surface we can say the formalism allows us to say that such an achronal
surface is at a specific time.
From the velocity fields defined by our many future-oriented trajectories emanating from
S we could choose ξa, a smooth, future-directed, unit timelike vector field that is twist-free
(that is, it satisfies the condition ξ[a∇bξc] = 0). If these choice is possible, then we can locally
foliate a subspace ofM with a one-parameter family of hypersurfaces. This will be equivalent
to defining a series of anachornal surfaces ordered from earlier to later in time by defining a
twist-free velocity field in I+(S). This cannot be done in general, it requires a locally well
behaved-causal structure. (Check section 2.8 in [14]).
This will not order the events outside these achronal surfaces S since they have an edge
(edge(S) 6= ∅). That is to say, there may exist point r ∈ I+(S) and a point q ∈ I−(S) in
the neighborhood of a point p in the boundary of S(S¯) that are connected by a timelike or
null curve that does not intersect with S. 6 Moreover, these points can be found in the
neighborhood U of every point p ∈ S. This would mean that an observer in the chronological
past of S can get to the chronological future by skipping the time t that the surface S would
be representing through points that are not chronologically related to S.
Any stricter chronological ordering will require more structure to be added. Particularly,
to further order all events in spacetime we will need these achronal surfaces to have no
edge, and for their chornological past and future to contain most of the manifold. When a
spacetime admits this we say it is globally hyperbolic, which will be defined more precisely in
the next section. Without considering global hyperbolocity however, general relativity leaves
us with many series of events localized in space that are ordered from earlier to later within
6 An imbedded achronal surface S with edge(S) = ∅ is called a partial Cauchy Surface.
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each series. The events were ordered in essence by following future-directed trajectories and
hence they form an A-series.
Equally, we can say that events are in the past, present or future, relative to a point
p, by saying that a future-directed trajectory would reach them, or that the point p could
have been reached by timelike trajectories from the past. In the case of global hyperbolicity,
we can speak of entire Cauchy surfaces being in the past, present, or future. In the next
section, we will argue not only that we are in a better position to talk about A-properties
than we were before (when we only considered SR), but that the notion of time-orientation
unavoidably introduced A-expressions in our conception of time.
The following definition is related to this section and it will be used in the next section:
Definition 5: The edge(S) of an achronal surface S is the set of all points p in the
boundary of S (S¯) such that, in the boundary U of p there are points r ∈ I+(S) and a point
q ∈ I−(S) that are connected by a timelike or null curve that does not intersect with S.
Definition 6: An achronal set is said to be a partial Cauchy surface if it a C1 embedded
spacelike surface with edge(S) = ∅.
VI. A-THEORY AND GENERAL RELATIVITY
Both A-series and B-Series were defined using time-orientation and timelike or lightlike
trajectories. While recognizing the importance of the future and past-directness of curves
which is an A-theory notion (only requires one point), the B-theorist can define the relation
-relation to indicate that there is a future-directed or past-directed timelike curve.
γ : [a, b]→M , (7)
where γ(a) = p  γ(b) = q. Points related in this way will also form a B-series,  ex-
pressing the relation between the two events, and hence confirming a B-expression. Given
the dependency between future- and past-direction and this two-event relation (), we find
that A-expression is ontologically prior to B-expressions in relativistic spacetimes. Never-
theless, this has not shown the stronger claim that there are A-expressions in relativistic
spacetimes that cannot be translated into a B-expression, e.g. like translating "the curve is
future-directed at point p" into "there are some points q, such that p q". Alternatively, we
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can notice that q ∈ I+(p) is later than p”, which are mathematically equivalent statements.
This last step is important since there are spaces (M,≥,), called causal spaces, which
define timelike and null curves in a similar fashion without appealing to a metric or time
orientation, and that can recover a lot of the structure of spacetime that cannot be derived
in those terms [15], [16]. Therefore, we are to show that there are properties of curves in
relativistic spacetimes that cannot be derived with respect to the  or ≥ relations and that
constitute A-properties.
The A-notion will be necessary to define global hyperbolicity, however, since we require
the notion of past inextendibility, which by definition only involves one event in question.
To define past(future)-inextendibility we first have to define the past (future) endpoints of a
curve γ. Let γ be a (future-) past-directed curve. A point p is a past (future) endpoint if for
every neighborhood U of p (open set in M containing p) there is a parameter value λ0 such
that γ(λ) ∈ U ∀λ > λ0 .
γ is past (future) inextendible if there is no such past (future) endpoint. Now, by definition,
there are no two events p and q to B-relate in order to translate the above statement into
a B-expression, while we identify this with an A-expression. Let γ be a curve, then of γ we
can say:
• γ a future-directed at γ(λ0) = p.
• γ is inextendible to the future at γ(λ0) = p.
Given the inexistence of events in γ required for it to be not extendible, neither of these
claims can be translated into B-expressions. The B-theorist may accept the priority of A-
theory concepts but may complain that we are being too stringent and that a B-expression can
suffice to describe events in certain spacetimes. The Friedmann-Robertson-Walker metric,
for instance, can express an age to the Universe, and order event via a global time coordinate.
This characteristic (called global hyperbolicity), however, requires past inextendibility to be
defined. We define the domain of dependence of S, D+(S), as
D+(S) = {q ∈M |Every past inextendible causal curve through q intersects S}
When
D(S) = D+(S) ∪D−(S) = M. (8)
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FIG. 2: S is a Cauchy surface on M at time t. For any point p all the future non-spacelike curves
intersect only once S and from any point q any past directed non-spacelike curves intersect S.
Then S is a Cauchy surface (see Fig. 2), and spacetime with a Cauchy surface is proven to
be globally hyperbolic, this is called Geroch’s theorem [17]. Moreover, note that edge(S) = ∅.7
Theorem 2. Let (M, g) be globally hyperbolic, and S a spacelike Cauchy hypersurface.
Then, there exists a Cauchy temporal function T : M → R × S such that S = T −1(0). We
can define a global time function T : M → R, such that it is constant through each Cauchy
surface S. T would be the time-coordinate and since M can be foliated then the topology of
M is diffeomorphic to R×S, where S is any Cauchy surface, see proof in [18], [19]. We have
constructed a time series relating to the events of the entire manifold. Can two observers
differ on what time it is at each surface? The answer is yes, the global function is not unique
and can be defined differently in different charts. Will they disagree with respect to the order
of events? No. Because we have ordered the events strictly by them being possible-causally
accessible, through the definition of the domain of dependence.
Nevertheless, global hyperbolicity can be defined in an alternative way: namely using
causal constraints and requiring that for any p and q the subset J+(p)
⋂
J−(p) is compact,
[11], [7]. In fact, this definition is one that can be specified in Causal Spaces (Lorentz
7 Other authors, like Hawkins and Ellis [7], define global hyperbolicity via causality conditions, specifically,
stable causality plus some more requirements. Our definition is the same as it is in [13].
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Length-Spaces) without any reference to time-inextendible curves [16]. Nevertheless, globally
hyperbolic spacetimes imply the existence of Cauchy surfaces which in turn implies the
existence of past(future)-inextendible curves. Therefore, even with an alternative definition,
there will be past(future) intextendible curves of spacetimes that cannot be described within
B-theory. We explicitly show this in proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Let (M,g) be a spacetime with partial Cauchy surface S such
that edge(S) = ∅. Then there exists a curve λ that has no past endpoint in M.
Proof. Let S be a partial Cauchy surface. Consider a point in the past Cauchy horizon of
S, p ∈ S¯ (boundary of S), and let it be an endpoint of the null curve λ ∈ M , λ(t) = p.
Then there is a t1 ∈ R and a neighborhood U ⊂ M such that if t1 < t, λ(t1) ∈ U (from
the definition of a past endpoint). Consider extending the curve λ into the past from p to a
point q in the neighborhood of p. Then q ∈ I−(p). Then, from q one can generate a timelike
curve that, by the virtue of being timelike, can get arbitrary close to λ, and hence remain
contained in U , but fail to intercept with p and S, and it can join with a point r ∈ U such
that r ∈ I+(p). Therefore, the endpoint p ∈ edge(S) and edge(S) 6= ∅. But S is a partial
Cauchy surface and hence edge(S) = ∅. Consequently, there can be no endpoint p of the
curve λ.
The proposition 2 also follows as a corollary of proposition 6.5.3 in Ref. [7].
Corollary 1: λ is past-inextendible since it has no endpoint, a similar prove
follows for future-inextendible curves.
Proposition 3: Let S be a closed achronal set. Then H+(S) is generated by null
geodesic segments which either have no past endpoints or have past endpoints at
edge(S). 8
Corollary 2: if edge(S) = 0, then the points in H+(S) are generated by null
geodesic segments that are inextendeble to the past.
8 Proved in [7].
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Therefore, given a globally hyperbolic spacetime M , there is a smooth spacelike Cauchy
hypersurface S and, thus, a global diffeomorphism between M and R × S that requires
future and past inextentendible curves to exist (A-notions) which cannot be described by
B-theory terms.
As a final stand, the B-theorist may hold that, while causal spaces (M , ≥, ) cannot
reproduce the structure of relativistic spacetimes solely with the notions of (≥, ) [16], it
can reproduce a notions of global hyperbolicity and ultimately recover the Lorentzian Metric
by recovering the null-cone structure, under the condition that the space is strongly causal
[15]. Nevertheless, these spaces are not equivalent to strongly causal relativist spacetimes or
general relativistic spacetimes for that matter. Furthermore, B-theorist may argue that this
missing structure in these spaces may not be important, or not important for the interpre-
tation of time. Nevertheless, not only can we not recover all structure from relativistic can
be recovered in these causal spaces [15], but further undesired causal behaviour is found in
these spaces ([16], see section 5). Moreover, the Lorentzian metric formulation of relativistic
spacetime (M, g) is the preferable framework since the Einstein equations are formulated
in terms of the metric, and it is conceptually simpler. Ultimately, the limitations found in
causal spaces and in the  and ≥ relations when describing structure in relativistic space-
times (M, g) are what shows the limitations of B-theory in describing the ordering of events
in the framework of General Relativity.9
It seems the result turned in favor of the A-theory in GR, since the notion of past and
future, via future-directedness and past-directness, is to be found written in most results
regarding time in GR textbooks. In general, we cannot order events outside our future and
past domain of dependence. These events may not form a time series: they can be achronal.
Causal notions, like the trajectory of timelike particles, is what allowed us to order the events,
and causality cannot be relative, so the ordering of events is not observer-dependent. This
allows us to avoid the problem of relative pastness and relative futurity found in special
9 Recently, Grant et al. [20], defined notions of extendibility and inextendibility of curves within the frame-
work of Causal spaces. A null (timelike) curve λ : [a, b) → M is extendible as a null (timelike) curve if
λ[a, b] ∈M . Note that this is a much weaker notion than the definition above, since an extendible curve in
relativistic spacetimes (M, g) can be extended to all values of parameter space (and still lie in the Manifold
while keeping its timelike or null character).
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relativity. This is more than a lucky terminology for the A-theory since these properties have
the characteristic of being definable at only one event, while B-expressions are two-place
relations.
Time-orientation is needed in order to make progress in formulating our concept of time
and causality. First, we talk about a particular direction in the manifold being “towards
the future”, chronological past and future, future and past directed curves, future and past
inextendeble curves, the -relation, the global time function, and the Cauchy Surface. The
B-theorist could suggest say that we should speak instead of vectors being towards later
times, instead of future-directed, but these expressions do not capture the nature of a time-
oriented spacetime. In terms which expressions pick out fundamental aspects of spacetime,
the A-theorist has an upper hand in General Relativity.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have constructed notions of future and past chronicity that allowed us to define time-
series, as akin as possible to the ones found in McTaggart’s work and the philosophy of time.
The ordering of events came first from the definition of future and past-directness, and the
time-orientation. Further structures were defined with the Cauchy surface, and the global
time function, to end up ordering all the events of the manifold.
Every such structure is always connected to the existence of timelike (or lightlike) curves
communicating causally one point to the next. Curves will allow us to order events in time,
but we need to tell them where to go, they have to know where the future is first, in order
to allow us to define any chronicle ordering in the manifold M . First we need to define
future-directed velocities at a point p, then we can locate the appropriate future events and
relate them via the B-relations  and .
In this view we cannot talk about a “one and only” present (a present that is common
to all points in space); each trajectory has its own present. If we can define a function ξa
to locally foliate a subspace of M into achronal surfaces, then each collection of achronal
surfaces will have its own present. That is not to mention that whether an event is in the
present can be relative; if an event is in the present for us (it is in our vicinity up to the
achronal surface) then other observers cannot argue that because according to them, this
19
event is in the future or in the past (because they can only describe the future or the past in
their vicinity).10
To conclude, let us not forget all of this is based on an account of time derived from the
notion of the length of a trajectory in spacetime. It may be that different accounts of time
can be extracted from the formalism of general relativity, or that one may have good reasons
to prefer a particular solution of the Einstein’s Equations. Nevertheless, when dealing with
a general, time-orientable solution to Einstein’s equations, we see no other way of ordering
events in time and, when doing so, notions related to A-theory appear as fundamental.
Moreover, this result extends beyond GR since more fundamental theories at low energy
(effective theories) should recover the same time features of general relativity, hence, the
time in this limit should be characterized by the A-theory.
Until now, we know of no other spacetime theory that is so friendly to the A-theorist.
For lifting any ordering of events off the ground, one needs the notions of time-orientation,
future-orientation, and past-orientation, which we argued are A-notions. Are the notions of
objective past, present, and future to be found in GR? Yes, given that 1) any ordering of
events in time will use them and 2) they are based on notions of causality, that are chart-
independent. In the context of GR, we seem to find the proper description with the A-theory:
from past, to present, to future.
10 This notion fulfills some of the desiderata formulated by Oliver Pooley, of what a relativistic notion of the
flow of time can be. It has A-theoretic notions and it goes away with a global “now”[4]. Nevertheless, the
topic of the flow of time requires a separate study.
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